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ABSTRACT:  This research examines wage differentials associated to different collective 
bargaining regimes in Spain and their evolution over time based on matched employer-
employee microdata. The primary objective is to analyse the wage differentials associated 
to the presence of a firm-level agreement and how they have evolved, taking into account 
the changes in the economic cycle and the recent labour reform of 2012. The second 
objective of the study is to examine the impact on wages of an absence of a collective 
agreement. This regime has become more prevalent due to the regulatory changes 
associated to the labour reform. From the evidence obtained it may be concluded that, 
although the higher wages observed in company-level agreements are systematically 
explained by the better characteristics of firms with labour agreements, there is a positive 
wage premium that favours workers mostly in the middle and upper-middle end of the 
wage distribution. This premium has remained relatively stable over time and does not 
seem to have been affected by the reform, although a degree of cyclical evolution cannot be 
ruled out. With respect to the impact on wages of the absence of a collective agreement, the 
results suggest that this level of bargaining, which is still fairly scarce, despite displaying an 
increasing trend, is associated, on average, to comparatively low wages, and, consequently, 
to higher wage flexibility. The principal explanatory cause for this wage differential is the 
existence of a negative wage premium for workers of firms covered by sectoral agreements, 
particularly those at the lower end of the distribution. 
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The aim of this research is to analyse the wage differentials existing in the Spanish 
labour market between different types of collective agreement, specifically between 
firm (or establishment) agreements and sectoral agreements (provincial or national). 
With data corresponding to the years 2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014, the study seeks to 
analyse the evolution of the wage premium of firm-level agreements over the years 
and, more specifically, whether this premium is sensitive to the economic cycle and 
whether it has been affected by the 2012 labour reform.   
In addition, for the period 2010-2014, the wage differentials (both average and 
those across the wage distribution) existing between the three levels of bargaining are 
analysed: firm-level agreement, sectoral agreement and, as a novelty, the absence of 
an agreement, due to the increase in the number of firms applying this regime as a 
result of the labour reform.  
Much like the North American literature on wage differentials between 
unionised and non-unionised workers, a range of studies has been carried out for 
certain European countries which analyse - given the institutional diversity between 
the two sides of the Atlantic - the wage differentials between workers covered by a 
collective agreement and those who are not, but especially the differentials between 
different types of agreements, as most European countries have a high level of 
coverage. A common finding of these studies is the detection of a positive wage 
premium for workers covered by an agreement as opposed to those who are not. 
Stephan and Gerlach (2005), Gürtzgen (2006) and Heinbach and Spindler (2007), 
among other more recent studies, estimate these positive premiums for Germany, a 
country where the regime of an absence of collective bargaining agreements has 
expanded. Evidence is available for a greater number of countries in terms of 
estimating a positive premium for employees covered by firm-level agreements with 
respect to those covered by higher-level agreements. Different studies coincide in 
estimating positive premiums, although of different sizes due partly to the use of 
different methodologies and because they refer to countries with their own 
institutional frameworks (Rycx, 2003 for Belgium; Card and de la Rica, 2006 for Spain; 
Plasman et al., 2007 for Denmark, Belgium and Spain; Daouli et al., 2013 for Greece; 
Dahl et al., 2013 for Denmark; Andreasson, 2014 for Sweden and Addison et al., 2014 
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for Germany, although – also for Germany - Gürtzgen, 2016 does not find any evidence 
of this positive premium). 
The hypotheses regarding both the power of collective bargaining and wage 
efficiency offered by firms can explain these positive wage premiums. There is no 
agreement, however, with respect to the effect on wage dispersion. Therefore, in 
some studies and countries there seems to be wider dispersion in the firm-level 
agreements as it is understood that within this bargaining framework the firm has 
greater autonomy to adjust wages to the productivity of the workers. However, there 
is also evidence of the contrary, supported by the argument that the firm-level 
agreement responds to the strength and pressure of the unions and a central objective 
of the unions is to reduce wage differentials between workers.  
One aspect which the literature has not addressed is the sensitivity of these 
wage premiums to the economic cycle, which constitutes one of the objectives of this 
study. The evidence regarding wage differentials by type of agreement for the Spanish 
case is very limited and outdated as it refers only to 1995. As mentioned above, Card 
and de la Rica (2006) and Plasman et al (2007) estimate a positive wage premium for 
the firm-level agreements with respect to sectoral agreements. Regards dispersion, 
Card and de la Rica (2006), Dell’Aringa and Pagani (2007) and Canal and Rodríguez 
(2016) coincide in that firm-level agreements increase wage inequality slightly, while 
Plasman et al (2007) find a reduction in the differences in these agreements.  
Analysing the Spanish case is particularly interesting for different reasons. On 
the one hand, the available evidence is scarce and partly contradictory. It also refers to 
a time in the distant past. On the other hand, the Spanish economy and its labour 
market have experienced a long-lasting deep economic crisis with unemployment 
reaching extreme levels, which may have altered the bargaining capacity of the 
workers and created difficulties for firms to continue paying efficiency wages. A third 
reason is that in 2012 a broad labour reform was passed which modified multiple 
aspects of the labour framework with potentially significant effects on wage levels.   
The effects of the 2012 labour reform on wage premiums can be summarised in 
the following hypotheses: 1) The premium of the firm-level agreements with respect to 
the sectoral agreements may have grown due to the reform of Article 41 of the 
Workers’ Statute (more favourable wages and working conditions than the agreement) 
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and due to the possible overriding of supra-firm agreements. It may have reduced, 
however, due to the greater decentralisation of bargaining. The possible effect of the 
limitation of ultra-activity seems minimal. 2) The premium of the sectoral agreements 
with respect to workers not covered will a priori reduce due to the modifications made 
to Article 41 and the possibility of an overriding of the sectoral agreement. 
The study makes several contributions. First, it quantifies the wage premium 
between the different types of agreement for the years 2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014. 
For the latter two years it also analyses the premium with respect to a regime of an 
absence of an agreement, an aspect which, to date, has only been studied for 
Germany. Second, it identifies the bargaining level at which the wage differentials are 
greatest by conducting an analysis across the complete wage distribution. Third, the 
evolution of the differences between types of agreement and between the quantiles of 
the distribution provides evidence on whether it has varied slightly with the end of 
growth and the impact of the deep recession.  
The study is structured as follows. The following section provides a description 
of the Spanish institutional collective bargaining framework. Next, a brief literature 
review is conducted. Subsequently, the databases are described and the evidence 
obtained is presented. The study ends by drawing the main conclusions.  
 
2. Institutional framework of collective bargaining in Spain 
After returning to democracy, Spain regulated the labour market following the model 
in force in neighbouring countries of Western Europe. The system for determining 
wages was approved in the Workers’ Statute of 1980. As well as using the example 
mentioned as a reference, it sought to compensate some individual features derived 
from the young democracy, such as the low union membership and the under-
representation of the unions in an economy predominated by small and medium-sized 
firms.  
Consequently, the Workers’ Statute established that the unions obtain the 
capacity to negotiate collective agreements based on a minimum result in the union 
elections (10%, or 15% regional), irrespective of the number of members. The 
agreements are negotiated by sector - usually on a provincial level - between the 
business associations and the unions that have obtained the minimum number of 
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representatives in the union elections: in this way many small and medium-sized firms 
are not present at either side of the table in the negotiations. Despite this, all of the 
firms of a sector - including those not present in the negotiation - are obliged to apply 
the agreement because it has the force of law and must be fulfilled by all firms in the 
same sector and territory, according to the general principle of automatic 
effectiveness. Therefore, the agreement legally extends to all firms automatically, 
irrespective of their size and without the need for them to adhere to it and it applies to 
all workers, both unionised and not. Furthermore, until the reform of 2012, the 
agreements had an unlimited validity as they were indefinitely renewed when they 
expired until a new agreement was made (ultra-activity). These features explain the 
very high coverage of collective bargaining in Spain (around 80% of wage earners), 
although there is a very low union density (approximately 18%) (ILO, 2015). 
There is also the possibility of negotiating firm-level agreements.  Bargaining is 
carried out by the board of directors and the firm worker's committee (or the 
personnel delegates in firms of less than 50 workers). The firm-level agreements 
cannot establish conditions that are worse for the workers than the sectoral 
agreements, which completely predominated until 1994 after which they continued to 
be prevalent but with certain limitations until 2012. These legal restrictions and the 
small size of Spanish firms explain the low incidence of decentralised bargaining and 
the low percentage of workers covered by these firm-level agreements (11% before 
the labour reform).  In practice, firm-level agreements are negotiated on the request 
of the firm worker's committee in large-size firms with a high union presence, 
generating higher wages than in sectoral agreements.  
The far-reaching labour reform approved in 2012 amidst the economic crisis 
gave rise to different changes in the collective bargaining system1. These changes 
sought to facilitate wage flexibility on a micro-economic level and enable fast 
modifications to be made to wages and other conditions so as to adapt to the 
economic cycle. Regarding collective bargaining and wage determination, the legal 
changes focused on four aspects: a) the reform introduced the applicative priority of 
firm-level agreements over sectoral agreements, with very few exceptions, promoting, 
therefore, the decentralisation of collective bargaining; b) it facilitated the overriding 
                                                          




of the sectoral agreements; c) it enabled firms to revoke the most advantageous 
conditions that the sectoral agreement may have been applying (including wages, 
hours worked and work schedule), and d) it limited the validity (ultra-activity) to one 
year after the finalisation of the agreement. 
The literature studying the impact on wages of these modifications of the legal 
framework concludes that there was an acceleration of wage adjustment which 
coincided with the approval of the reform. One of the most evident effects of the 
reform is precisely wage moderations which has given rise to greater macro-economic 
wage flexibility (Izquierdo et al., 2013; Arpaia et al., 2015; International Monetary 
Fund, 2015 and Izquierdo and Puente, 2015).  There is also evidence to sustain that the 
wage adjustment has not affected all workers equally, but has had a greater impact on 
new hires (Fernández-Kranz, 2015; OECD, 2015 and Orsini, 2014) and low wage 
earners (López-Mourelo and Malo, 2015). The evidence on microeconomic wage 
flexibility, on the other hand, is scarce. It is worth pointing out that the IMF (2015) has 
observed that after the implementation of the reform, sectoral and regional wages 
continue to respond very weakly to specific variations in the economic circumstances 
of their respective environments. To date, the literature has not analysed the effect 
that the labour reform could have had on the wage differentials in accordance with the 
bargaining regime.  
The effect of the labour reform on theses wage differentials depends largely on 
the effective use made by employers of each of the above-mentioned wage flexibility 
factors. So, following the increased decentralisation of bargaining, the new firm 
agreements correspond to smaller firms, which are predictably less productive, and 
therefore pay lower wages, contributing to reducing the wage gap between firm and 
sectoral agreements. The possibility of not applying the sectoral agreement can 
generate effects that are difficult to predict as they depend largely on the response of 
the firm in the WES questionnaire regarding the type of agreement that it is covered 
by. Nevertheless, the effect would be very small as non-application has affected only 
0.14% of firms with an agreement (Rodriguez and Canal, 2016). The revoking of 
conditions which are more advantageous than those in the agreement (Article 41 of 
the Workers’ Statute) will have reduced the difference between the agreed wage and 
7 
 
the wage that is effectively paid2. As this revocation will have been applied mainly in 
firms with a sectoral agreement, it is expected, ceteris paribus, that the wage gap will 
increase between the two types of agreement. On the other hand, there will be a 
reduction in the wage differential between the wages of firms with a sectoral 
agreement and those of firms without an agreement. The size of the effect will depend 
on the number of firms that have used this flexibility measure, which can be assumed 
to be very few according to what can be deduced from other sources (Izquierdo and 
Jimeno, 2015).  Finally, the reduction of the ultra-activity to one year will not have had 
any relevant effects, as in 2014, the Spanish Supreme Court ruled that the conditions 
agreed in the expired agreement will remain unchanged in the employment contracts 
of the workers. In summary, the effects of the 2012 labour reform on wage 
differentials depending on the bargaining regime, when they exist, will have the 
opposite sign (lower differential due to decentralisation and larger differential due to 
the reduction in the wage cushion), and, in any case they are likely to be scarce. 
 
3. Literature review 
Since the 1970s there has been an abundance of studies for the United States on the 
wage differentials between unionised and non-unionised workers (Block and Kushin, 
1978; Ashenfelter, 1978). These studies estimate a wage premium for unionised 
workers of around 15%3. There has been much criticism of these cross sectional 
studies (mainly wage imputation, poor classification of union status of workers and 
bias in the selection of the unionised workers) and doubts have been raised regarding 
the size of the wage premium. The estimates based on longitudinal data, even when 
correcting for the possible bias in the selection, only moderate the wage premium 
slightly (Freeman, 1984; Card, 1996). The studies conducted by Hirsch (2004) and 
Hirsch and Schumacher (2004) seeking to resolve a good part of the problems confirm 
the previous results. 
Much like the North American literature, a range of studies has been carried 
out for certain European countries which analyse - given the institutional diversity 
                                                          
2 Cardoso and Portugal (2005) call this difference the wage cushion and they analyse it for the case of 
Portugal with 1999 data. Its size varies between 0.20 and 0.47, depending on the sector and its effect is 
to increase wage dispersion. 
3 Lewis (1986) summarises this early literature and discusses its critical points. 
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between the two sides of the Atlantic - the wage differentials between workers 
covered by a collective agreement and those who are not, but especially the 
differentials between different types of agreements as most European countries have 
a high level of coverage4. The European literature is much more recent and limited. 
The majority of studies use individual cross-sectional data. A common finding of these 
studies is the detection of a positive wage premium of between 5% and 10% for 
workers covered by an agreement as opposed to those who are not. The amount 
seems to depend not only on the controlled variables and the years, but also on the 
social model prevailing in the country. Therefore, contrary to the majority of 
continental countries, in Ireland, a country with a liberal Anglo-Saxon social model, the 
wage premium of the agreement is negative (McGuinnes et al., 2010) while in the 
Netherlands, a corporatist country, the premium is non-existent (Hartog et al., 2002). 
Magda et al. (2016) also estimate non-existent premiums in the Czech Republic in 2002 
and 2006. 
For the majority of countries, including Spain, the coverage of sectoral 
agreements is so high that practically everybody is covered by an agreement. 
Therefore, in this case, only wage premiums of firm-level agreements with respect to 
sectoral agreements have been estimated. The studies published by Rycx (2003) for 
Belgium, de Card and de la Rica (2006) for Spain, de Plasman et al. (2007) for Denmark, 
Belgium and Spain, de Daouli et al. (2013) for Greece, de Dahl et al. (2013) for 
Denmark or de Andreasson (2014) for Sweden estimate premiums for firm-level 
agreements which are mostly between 5% and 7%. 
Germany is, undoubtedly the country for which there is most literature. This is 
because it has a triple-level wage bargaining regime, including a significant and 
growing part of its business fabric that has no type of coverage. There are also rich 
longitudinal databases available for Germany. The studies carried out with cross-
sectional data (Stephan and Gerlach, 2005; Heinbach and Spindler, 2007; Khon and 
Lembcke, 2007; Fitzenberger et al., 2008) estimate premiums of sectoral agreements 
with respect to uncovered workers of between 4% and 10% which are greater among 
women and in western Germany. The premiums of firm-level agreements are 
approximately 7%. The most recent studies carried out with longitudinal data enable the 
                                                          
4The principle characteristics and results of the European literature on the subject may be consulted In 
Table A.1. of the Appendix.   
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selection biases to be completely controlled and, therefore, reduce the size of the premiums 
to around 3% (Gürtzgen, 2006; Addison et al., 2014). In a more recent study, Gürtzgen 
(2016) rules out the existence of real wage premiums of the agreements once 
selection biases and the declining trend of firms that end up switching to a no-
agreement regime are controlled. 
Contrary to Germany, the evidence regarding the wage differentials by type of 
agreement for the Spanish case is very limited and outdated as it refers only to 1995. 
As mentioned above, Card and de la Rica (2006) and Plasman et al (2007) estimate a 
positive wage premium for the firm-level agreements with respect to sectoral 
agreements. The size of the premium is estimated at between 4% and 7%5. It is worth 
pointing out the efforts undertaken by Card and de la Rica (2006) to try to control the 
selection biases despite using cross-sectional data. The methodology that they propose 
has been used by subsequent literature6 in cases where it is not possible to work with 
longitudinal data.  
 
4. Data 
The microdata used in the research correspond to the 2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014 
waves of the Wage Structure Survey (WES) carried out by Spain’s National Statistics 
Institute (INE). It is a statistical operation conducted every four years which constitutes 
the sample for Spain of the European Structure of Earnings Survey, a survey 
undertaken with a harmonised methodology in all of the member countries of the 
European Union and based on independent cross sections. This survey is administered 
to firms (it uses a two-stage sampling technique among wage earners based on the 
social security contribution accounts of their firms) and covers employees registered 
with Social Security throughout the month of October during the year of reference. On 
the other hand, although the sectoral coverage of the survey has been extended over 
time, the four waves analysed are representative of practically all of the 
establishments of the private sector (specifically, they include those establishments of 
any size registered with the general social security regime and whose economic activity 
corresponds to sections B to S of the CNAE-2009 sectoral classification. Therefore, it 
                                                          
5 Canal and Rodríguez (2004) detect –also for 1995- a premium of 11% in a study analysing wage 
dispersion in Spanish companies.  
6 MacGuinnes et al. (2010) and Daouli et al. (2013) use it, as does this study. 
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leaves out, exclusively, certain sectors of activity such as agriculture or domestic 
service), although it is worth highlighting that firms with less than ten employees are 
covered by the survey only after the 2006 wave. It consists of a matched employer-
employee database which provides highly detailed information about wages and the 
characteristics of the workers (sex, age, education and nationality); their job positions 
(occupation, seniority, type of contract and undertaking of supervision tasks) the firms 
(sector, size, region, type of ownership and type of market) and information referring 
to the type of collective agreement existing in each of the establishments considered7. 
The wage concept used in this research is the hourly gross wage, calculated by dividing 
the pay corresponding to the month of reference of the survey (October) by the 
weekly working hours multiplied by 4.3. Wages are expressed in gross terms and their 
calculation incorporates any type of payment by the firms, including commissions, 
bonuses for night and weekend work and overtime payments.   
The type of collective bargaining that exists is indicated by each firm as a 
response to a specific question of the WES about how labour relations are regulated to 
cover the majority of the workers. Until the wave of 2006, the possible responses to 
this question only considered different types of collective agreement, while from the 
2010 wave this question requests that the respondent indicate whether a collective 
agreement or, if not, any other form of regulation exists. Therefore, it explicitly 
considers the possibility that no collective agreement exits. Consequently, the 
dependent variables in the analysis correspond to categorical variables that reflect the 
presence of a firm-level collective agreement (including agreements on a firm, work 
centre or group of firm’s level) or the absence of collective bargaining (if another type 
of regulation is indicated by the firm), as opposed to the alternative of a sectoral 
agreement (state or lower level).  
Much like previous studies on the same issue, the analysis is limited to full-time 
employees working in the private sector, given the differences in the wage 
determination processes with respect to the public sector. The explanatory variables 
which have been considered cover both the characteristics of the individuals and their 
job positions and firms. The individual characteristics refer to the nationality of the 
                                                          
7 To analyse the topic proposed, it would be more appropriate to use a longitudinal matched employer-
employee database, however, the only source that fulfils these requirements for the Spanish economy, 




individual (distinguishing between natives and immigrants); the level of general 
education (distinguishing between three levels: primary, secondary and tertiary 
education) and age (distinguishing between four brackets). The characteristics of the 
job positions are years of seniority in the current job and its quadratic form; the type 
of contract (indefinite or fixed-term); occupation (six categories) and the undertaking 
of supervision tasks. Finally, the attributes of the firms are the sector (twelve 
categories, corresponding to the sections of the CNAE-93); size (three brackets) and 
region (seven NUTS1). 
The sample of the study has filtered out observations which provide no 
information about the main variables of interest, such as those corresponding to 
individuals with hourly wages of less than 2.5 euros or over 200 euros. Furthermore, it 
has also eliminated observations referring to establishments with less than two 
observations and, in order to limit the analysis to workers employed in the private 
sector, it has eliminated observations corresponding to section O of the CNAE-2008 
classification (Public Administration and defence; compulsory social security) and 
publicly controlled firms in other sections of activity. The final sample is made up of 




5.1. Descriptive evidence  
Table 1 contains information about the average hourly wage (expressed in euros and 
logarithms respectively), according to the level of collective bargaining during the 
period considered (depending on the information on the bargaining level contained in 
the EES, for the whole of the period a distinction is made between sector and firm-
level agreements and, after 2010 the absence of an agreement is also distinguished). 
This evidence confirms the existence of significant wage differentials between 
bargaining levels, which also experience considerable changes over time.  So, taking 
the predominant type of bargaining as a reference, namely the sector level, it is found 
that in firms with their own agreement, average wages are substantially higher 
(between 0.2 and 0.3 logarithmic points or, alternatively between approximately 20% 
and 30%) although the differential tends to decrease over time.  The wage differential 
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associated to firm agreements is not, however, homogeneous across the whole wage 
distribution (Table 2), It has an inverted U shape, being comparatively lower at the left 
tail, increasing significantly in the central part of the wage distribution and falling off at 
the right tail. In the case of firms which are not covered by collective bargaining, the 
average wages are notably lower in comparative terms, although the wage penalty 
observed displays a significant decreasing trend between 2010 and 2014 (from 0.18 to 
0.06 logarithmic points). This wage penalty is comparatively more acute in the lower 
part of the distribution and reduces over the length of the curve until it becomes 
favourable for workers in firms without agreements at the right end of the distribution 
in 2014. 
Table A.2 of the Appendix contains the descriptive statistics of the samples 
used in the analysis. Based on these statistics, differences in the characteristics of the 
workers and their job positions can be appreciated between the different bargaining 
regimes, which are significant and persistent over time. Therefore, taking sectoral 
bargaining as a reference again, it may be observed that workers employed in firms 
with their own agreement have differential characteristics which, in general terms, are 
systematically associated to higher wages. Without being exhaustive, these employees 
are mainly men and native; on average they have higher levels of education, they are 
older with more years of seniority; they display a lower incidence of fixed-term 
contracts and have a greater presence in large manufacturing firms with an 
international focus, and, as described above, with a workforce that is comparatively 
qualified (observed in dimensions such as age, seniority and education) and with a 
comparatively low presence of women and immigrants. In the case of firms without an 
agreement, on the other hand, in relative terms we can observe both a higher 
presence of certain characteristics associated to lower relative wages (including a 
significant incidence of women and a higher rate of fixed-term contracts) and 
comparatively higher wages (higher education levels and an occupational structure 
with a greater presence of professions which require higher levels of qualification). 
There is also a sectoral distribution characterised by a greater presence in activities in 
the services sector.  
Finally, with respect to the distribution of the samples according to the 
bargaining regime (last row of Table A.2), it is worth highlighting that the relative 
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weight of collective bargaining at the firm level is relatively stable throughout the 
period, with values of between 20% and 25%, with the only exception being the 
increase experienced at the beginning of the economic crisis between 2006 and 2010. 
In the case of an absence of bargaining, its relative presence is comparatively lower, 
although over time it can be observed to increase, from 2.5% of the workforce in 2010 
to 3.8% in 2014. 
5.2. Results of the analysis 
Table 3 shows the results of estimating a Mincer equation that relates the logarithm of 
individual wages to different variables associated with the characteristics of the 
workers, their job positions and the characteristics of the firm where they work.  This 
equation has been estimated separately for each of the samples available of the Wage 
Structure Survey (2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014), using the sample elevation factors on 
an individual level.   
The controls consider gender, nationality (native/immigrant), educational level 
(3 levels), age (4 categories), seniority in the firm and its square, whether workers have 
a dead-end contract or not, the occupational category (6 groups), the region of the 
establishment on a NUTS1 level (7 regions), the sector of activity (12 sectors), the size 
of the firm (3 categories), the firm's principal market (4 groups) and an additional 
series of variables that include the average characteristics of the workers of each firm 
and that, as argued Daouli et al (2013), enable the control (at least partially) of the 
possible bias derived from the non-random assignment of workers between firms. 
Finally, the predominant level of collective bargaining is considered, which, for the 
period 2002-2006, only takes two values (firm-level agreement or higher level 
agreement). For the period 2010-2014, however, it takes three values (firm-level 
agreement, higher level agreement or absence of an agreement). The category of 
reference for this group of variables in the different estimates is the existence of 
agreements at a higher level than the firm level. Given that the variable of interest (the 
predominant level of collective bargaining) and other characteristics of the firm are 
aggregated at a higher level than that of the endogenous variable (the logarithm of 
individual wages), the standard errors of the estimate have been corrected by applying 
the cluster option at a firm level. Card and de la Rica (2006) also indicate the need for 
the analysis to take into account the tendency of the firm to adopt one type of 
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collective bargaining or another. For this reason, a probit model has been used to 
estimate the probability that a specific firm is covered by collective bargaining at the 
firm level as opposed to a higher level agreement. This model has been estimated for 
each of the years available, introducing the characteristics of the firm and its workers 
as explanatory variables. This has enabled a propensity score to be obtained which was 
subsequently introduced as an additional regressor in the Mincer equations for each of 
the four waves considered. For the two waves corresponding to 2010 and 2014, the 
same procedure has been carried out for the probability of not having an agreement as 
opposed to the probability of having a sectoral agreement8. In these two equations, 
therefore, an additional regressor has been introduced that includes the propensity 
score obtained through this additional analysis. The inclusion of the propensity scores 
in the Mincer equations controls the potential impact on the estimates of the possible 
situation where the predominant type of collective bargaining in a firm is correlating 
with specific unobservable factors that may simultaneously affect wages. 
The results obtained in relation to the control variables coincide with those in 
the literature. For the four waves analysed, evidence has been found of a positive 
wage premium for men, which, at the beginning of the period, was around 16 
logarithmic points and at the end had fallen to 12. Returns to education are also 
positive and significant for the whole of the period analysed both for secondary and 
tertiary levels of education. Greater experience (measured through age) and seniority 
in the job position also have a positive effect on wages although, in the case of 
seniority, there is evidence of decreasing returns, given that the quadratic term is 
statistically significant at the usual levels. Having an indefinite contract as opposed to a 
fixed-term contract also has a positive effect on wages of between 4 and 7 logarithmic 
points depending on the year analysed. The most notable firm characteristics are the 
existence of a positive wage premium for those workers who are employed by firms of 
a larger size and those oriented towards European or international markets.  
With respect to the predominant level of collective bargaining, the evidence 
obtained indicates the existence of a wage premium associated with firm agreements. 
In 2002, this premium was 6.5 logarithmic points which increased slightly in 2006 to 
7.5 logarithmic points and then reduced to 6.4 logarithmic points in 2010 and to 5.4 
                                                          
8 The results of these estimates are available from the authors on request.  
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logarithmic points in 2014. As the findings reveal, the premium has remained relatively 
stable over time, although a cyclical profile cannot be ruled out. In fact, the estimated 
coefficient increased during the years of economic growth, then reduced during the 
first phase of the crisis and also during the second recession after the labour reform of 
2012. This result is most probably explained by the wage dynamics of firms with their 
own agreement. Two elements confirm this hypothesis. First, based on the Wage 
Dynamics Network, Bertola et al. (2010) conclude that wage adjustment to changes in 
the economic situation is more frequent in firms that have their own collective 
agreement. Similarly, Bentolila et al. (2010) highlight that newly-signed agreements 
are more sensitive to the cycle and, therefore, the large firms with their own 
agreements are those that “have been able to adapt more  quickly to the new 
economic context” (Page 190). Second, the data from the Annual Labour Cost Survey 
show that the wage dynamics of firms with more than 200 workers - those more likely 
to sign their own agreement – have been more moderate than the average since 2008. 
These data and the afore-mentioned studies coincide with the idea that the probable 
reduction in the wage differential between firm and sector agreements is essentially 
due to greater wage flexibility during the crisis in firms with their own agreements. 
The probable decrease in the wage differential between 2010 and 2014 could 
have partly been driven, as indicated earlier, by the growing decentralisation of 
bargaining, facilitated by the labour reform of 2012.   
The results obtained with respect to the absence of a collective agreement, a 
level which has gained importance in the latter years considered, show a negative 
effect on wages, which, in 2010, amounted to 11.2 logarithmic points but only 4.3 in 
2014. Thus, it seems that this regime, driven by the regulatory changes associated to 
the labour reform, is related to comparatively lower wages once the rest of the factors 
are controlled, and, consequently, linked to higher wage flexibility. The reduction of 
the average penalty observed between 2010 and 2014 may be due to the fact that, 
thanks to the greater flexibility, these firms, which are not subject to an agreement, 
implemented the bulk of the wage adjustment at the beginning of the crisis, a period 
for which there are no data available in order to confirm this. On the contrary, the 
firms subject to a sector agreement with an average duration of more than two years 
have needed more time to moderate their wages. This may have been facilitated after 
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2012 by some of the measures approved in the reform, such as the possibility of not 
applying agreements or the greater facility to withdraw non-negotiated wage 
supplements. On the other hand, it cannot be ruled out that the reduction of the wage 
penalty for the non-covered regime may also be due to a composition effect, owing to 
the entry of many small tertiary firms into this category. 
The previous evidence corresponds to an analysis of averages based on an 
estimate using minimum least squares. In order to confirm that the effect of the 
different regimes of collective bargaining considered is not linear and varies across the 
whole of the wage distribution, the results obtained using quantile regressions are 
presented below. To do this, two different methods have been used: the standard 
quantile regression method (Koenker and Basset, 1978) and the unconditioned 
quantile regression method proposed more recently by Firpo et al. (2009). Therefore, 
while the former quantifies the effects of the explanatory variables on the conditioned 
distribution of the dependent variable (and, consequently, on the within-groups wage 
dispersion for groups of workers with the same observed characteristics), the second 
quantifies the effects on the unconditioned distribution (also including an additional 
effect of between-groups wage differences), which is of more interest.  
Therefore, Tables 4 and 5 display the results of estimating conditioned and 
unconditioned regressions of the Mincer equation which relates the logarithm of 
individual salaries with the afore-described variables for each of the years considered, 
in a similar way to the results presented in Table 3. Only the results obtained for the 
variables associated to the predominant level of collective bargaining are presented9. 
As shown in Table 4, (conditioned regression), the wage premium associated to having 
a firm agreement has an inverted U shape in 2002 and 2006, while after 2010, 
coinciding with the crisis, the premium is higher for the individuals situated on the 
right part of the wage distribution, showing, therefore a growing trend. The results of 
the more recent years, in line with the findings of Canal and Rodríguez (2016a), show 
that wage dispersion rises in firms with their own agreement. It may also be verified 
that the differences between the wage premiums observed throughout the 
distribution became more pronounced during the crisis. The results obtained with 
respect to workers not covered by an agreement are very different in the two years 
                                                          
9 The detailed results are available from the authors on request. 
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2010 and 2014. In 2010, not having an agreement systematically represented a wage 
penalty compared with being covered by a higher level agreement than the firm level. 
However, in 2014, there are important differences across the distribution and no 
penalties can be observed for workers located at the right hand side of the 
distribution. This result is probably due to important changes in the composition of the 
firm and workers over time.  
The results in Table 5 (unconditioned regression) are similar, but have two 
differential characteristics which are worth highlighting. First, the positive premium of 
the firm-level agreement maintains its inverted U shape over time. Its effect is clear: at 
all times it widens the wage inequality at the lower part of the distribution, while it 
reduces it at the upper part and it is not affected by the economic crisis or the labour 
reform of 2012. On the other hand, the unconditioned distribution has a much more 
pronounced concavity than the conditioned distribution. This may be indicating that 
the between-groups effect dominates the central part of the distribution, while the 
opposite is the case at the two tails, as there the estimated premium is higher in the 
conditioned regression.  
 The final part of the empirical analysis involves the Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition (Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder; 1973) of the wage differentials between 
bargaining regimes with respect to the explained components due to the differences in 
the endowment of characteristics observed (component of characteristics or explained 
part) and, alternatively, due to the difference in wage returns of these characteristics 
(component of returns or unexplained part). This decomposition has been developed 
for both the average wage differentials (using the traditional Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition) and for the wage differentials observed in different points of the wage 
distribution (using the equivalent method proposed by Firpo et al. (2011), based on the 
unconditioned quantile regression). Following the recommendations of Firpo et al. 
(2011), the empirical strategy has evolved from initially carrying out a robustness test, 
comparing the results of the standard econometric decomposition with an alternative 
decomposition which, combining the first with the reweighting method of DiNardo et 
al. (1996), based on the use of counterfactual distributions, enables the presence of 
two additional error terms to be taken into account, potentially arising from the non-
linearity of the model. In so far as the results of the two methods are comparable in 
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practice, given that the effect of the errors is on the whole relatively small (Tables A.3 
and A.4 of the Appendix, where the so-called composition effect corresponds to the 
characteristics component and the bargaining regime effect to the returns 
component), the rest of the analysis focuses on the results of the standard 
decomposition without reweighting (Tables 6 to 8 and Figures 1 and 2; in these latter 
figures the characteristics component is divided between the characteristics of the 
individuals, that of their job positions and their firms).   
Figure 1 graphically represents the afore-mentioned, in the sense that the wage 
differential is positive in favour of the firm-level agreements with respect to the 
sectoral agreements and can be observed across the whole of the wage distribution 
(although it is not constant as it has an inverted U shape being higher for the wages of 
the central quantiles). Furthermore, when the evolution over time is compared it is 
observed that the slope of the curve reduces, particularly in 2014 when it is 
substantially flatter.  
As previously mentioned, the decomposition of these differences reveals that 
the endowment of characteristics has a greater relative explanatory capacity across 
the wage distribution in all years. Specifically, they represent around three quarters of 
the average difference observed, decreasing somewhat over time from 79% in 2002 to 
73% in 2014. The characteristics with the highest explanatory capacity are those 
relating to the job position and the firm. On the contrary, the individual characteristics 
have a low prominence, revealing that the labour force characteristics are fairly similar 
between bargaining regimes systematically throughout the whole distribution.  
Nevertheless, these individual characteristics gain a degree of importance as the wage 
distribution advances, as men with a high level of education and extensive professional 
experience have a greater presence at the right end. The job position characteristics 
have a growing trend as there is a greater presence of permanent jobs and good 
occupations towards the right part of the distribution. Meanwhile, the characteristics 
of the firm have a greater quantitative importance and have an upward trend until a 
fairly advanced point of the distribution, but reduce at the right end, producing a 
slightly concave shape. The most relevant characteristics for explaining this trend are 
the market in which the firm operates, the composition of the workforce within it and 
the propensity score (which highlights the importance of controlling the possible 
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correlation between the predominant type of collective bargaining in the firm and the 
unobservable factors which may simultaneously affect wages). Finally, the wage 
premium (corresponding to the unexplained component of the decomposition) shows 
a clear inverted U shape, with a fairly large size in the central quantiles of the 
distribution and very low or zero values (even negative in some parts) at the extremes. 
The inverted U shape of the wage premium which is slightly off-centred towards the 
right enables us to conclude that the firm-level agreements favour the workers in the 
central part of the wage distribution more intensely and quite a lot less the workers 
with higher wages, while in general, they have no effect (except on 2006) on workers 
with the lowest wages of the firm. A possible explanation of these results would be 
that the recently hired workers are concentrated in this first decile as the same 
agreement can establish lower wages for them than the rest of the workers, provided 
that there is an “objective and reasonable justification”10.  
Figure 2 shows the decomposition of the wage differentials between workers 
covered by a sector agreement and those who are not in 2010 and 2014. Contrary to 
the results of Figure 1, the evidence shown in Figure 2 reveals how the factor with the 
greatest explanatory capacity of the wage differential is - by far - the negative wage 
premium. The endowment of characteristics of uncovered workers seems only slightly 
worse than that of workers covered by sectoral agreements. For example, the 
differences observed in individual characteristics are practically imperceptible across 
the whole of the distribution (only a greater presence of young women). The 
differences in the job position characteristics are also growing in this case, as a result 
of the different incidence of temporary hiring over the whole of the wage distribution.  
The characteristics of the firms penalise uncovered workers in terms of their wages, 
particularly in 2010 as there is a greater presence of low salary sectors and of firms 
operating predominantly in the local market. The incidence of these characteristics is 
relatively constant over the distribution. However, the component with the highest 
explanatory capacity of the wage differentials observed is, in this case, the negative 
wage premium of workers without coverage with respect to the sectoral agreement. In 
2010, the whole of the distribution is affected, although unequally as it has a clear 
inverted U shape and the highest penalties are observed at the two extremes of the 
                                                          
10 According to sentence 17/2016 of Spain's National High Court, these double pay scales emerged in the 
1990s and have been used more in moments of economic crisis. 
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distribution. On the other hand, in 2014, it has a growing trend as it progresses along 
the distribution from negative but decreasing values in the first half to positive and 
strongly increasing values at the right end. Therefore, the results of the most recent 
period seem to indicate that market forces significantly widen the wage differentials 
between workers, while sectoral agreements reduce them.  
In short, when comparing the wage premiums that emerge under the different 
wage bargaining regimes, it can be observed that sectoral agreements, compared with 
the free functioning of the market, reduce wage differentials due to the positive 
premium generated. They also increase the wages of workers at the lower part of the 
wage distribution, reducing wage inequality. The firm-level agreements seem to rectify 
this correction. As they give rise to a higher positive premium for the workers of the 
central part and some of the workers on the right of the distribution, they re-establish 
part of the previously existing wage differentials. Therefore, it can be said that the 
wages established in sectoral agreements respond to the bargaining power of union 
organisations and favour the majority of their members and voters; relatively low 
wage earners. On the contrary, firm-level agreements enable the more productive 
firms to pay efficiency wages to the more productive workers, those who they have an 
interest in retaining and motivating, given that they accumulate more training and 
experience and their wages are situated in the middle and upper-middle part of the 
distribution. It is surprising, however, that the workers at the higher end of the 
distribution receive a relatively lower premium which probably does not reduce their 
wages with respect to the previous situation. 
 
6. Conclusions 
The objective of the research is to examine the wage differentials associated to 
different collective bargaining regimes in Spain and their evolution over time based on 
the microdata from the 2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014 waves of the Wage Structure 
Survey. 
Therefore, the primary objective of the study is to analyse the wage 
differentials associated to the presence of a firm-level agreement and how they have 
evolved in the recent past, characterised by changes in the economic cycle and the 
recent labour reform which has given rise to this more decentralised type of 
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bargaining. The evidence obtained in this sense confirms that the comparatively higher 
wages in firms covered by their own agreement in relation to the sectoral bargaining 
level are explained largely by the better endowment of labour force and firm 
characteristics. However, even when this element is controlled, a significant wage 
premium persists associated to firm-level agreements. This premium has remained 
relatively stable over time, falling only during the first phase of the economic crisis and 
does not seem to have been affected by the important regulatory changes associated 
to the labour reform of 2012. 
The second objective of the study is to examine the impact on wages of an 
absence of a collective agreement, a regime which has also gained prevalence due to 
the labour reform. The results obtained in this sense suggest that this area of 
negotiation, which still has a fairly insignificant relative presence despite displaying an 
increasing trend, is associated, on average, to comparatively low wages, and, 
consequently, to higher wage flexibility. 
 When the analysis is extended across the whole of the wage distribution, the 
results obtained confirm that the wage differentials between firm-level and sectoral 
agreements are systematically explained in all points of the distribution by the 
different endowment of characteristics (being comparatively more relevant the 
differences in firm characteristics). Furthermore, the wage premium in favour of firm 
agreements has an inverted U shape (favouring workers in the middle and upper-
middle part of the wage distribution to a greater extent).  Similarly, when the wage 
differentials are decomposed between firms without an agreement compared with 
those covered by sectoral agreements, it can be observed that the main explanatory 
cause of the lower wages established by the market is the existence of a negative wage 
premium which varies throughout the distribution. Therefore, while the negative 
premium in 2010 affects the whole of the distribution, it does so unequally, implying 
higher penalties at the extremes of the distribution. On the contrary, in 2014, the 
premium begins at negative values and increases throughout the distribution, reaching 
clearly positive values at the extreme right. This evidence seems to suggest, therefore, 
that in the absence of an agreement the wage differentials widen between workers, 
while sectoral agreements reduce them.  
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 In conclusion, it should be pointed out that the findings of this study seem to 
suggest that wages established in sectoral agreements respond to the negotiating 
power of union organisations and favour the majority of their members and voters, 
while firm-level agreements enable the more productive firms to pay efficiency wages 





Addison, J., Teixeira, P., Evers, K., Bellman, L. (2014), “Indicative and Updated Estimates of the 
Collective Bargaining Premium in Germany”, Industrial Relations, 53 (1), pp. 125-156. 
Andreasson, H. (2014), The Effect of Decentralized Wage Bargaining on the Structure of Wages 
and Firm Performance, The Ratio Institute, RATIO Working Paper no. 241. 
Arpaia, A.; Kiss, A. (2015), “Benchmarks for the assessment of wage developments: Spring 
2015”, DG EMPL Analytical Web Note 2/2015 
Ashenfelter, O. (1978), “Union relative wage effects: new evidence and a survey of their 
implications for wage inflation”, in Richard Stone and William Peterson (eds.), 
Econometric contribution to public policy, St Martin’s Press, Chapter 2: 31 y ss. 
Bentolila, S., Izquierdo, I., Jimeno, J. F. (2010), “Negociación colectiva: la gran reforma 
pendiente”, Papeles de economía española 124, july, pp. 176-192. 
Bertola, G., Dabusinskas, A., Hoeberichts, M., Izquierdo, M., Kwapil, C., Montornés, J., 
Radowski, D. (2010), “Price, wage and employment response to shocks: Evidence from the 
WDN survey”, ECB WP 1164. 
Blinder, A. S. (1973), “‘Wage discrimination: reduced form and structural estimates”, Journal of 
Human Resources, 8 (4): 436–55. 
Bloch, F.E., Kushin, M. S. (1978), “Wage determination in the union and no-union sectors”, 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 31, pp. 183-192  
Canal, J. F., Rodríguez, C. (2004), “Collective bargaining and within-firm wage dispersion in 
Spain”, British Journal of Industrial Relations, 42 (3), pp. 481-506. 
Canal, J. F., Rodriguez, C. (2016) "Collective bargaining, wage dispersion and the economic 
cycle: Spanish evidence", The Economic and Labour Relations Review, 27 (4), pp. 471–489. 
Card, D. (1996), “The effect of unions on the structure of wages: A longitudinal analysis”, 
Econometrica, 64 (4), pp. 957-979. 
Card, D., de la Rica, S. (2006), "Firm-level contracting and the structure of wages in Spain." ILR 
Review 59 (4), pp. 573-592. 
Cardoso, A. R., Portugal, P. (2005), "Contractual Wages and the Wage Cushion under Different 
Bargaining Settings", Journal of Labor Economics, 23 (4), pp. 875-902. 
Dahl, C. M., Le Maire, D., Munch, J. R. (2013), “Wage Dispersion and Decentralization of Wage 
Bargaining”, Journal of Labor Economics 31 (3), pp. 501-533. 
Daouli, J., Demoussis, M. (2013), Giannakopoulos, N. Laliotis, I (2013), “Firm-Level Collective 
Bargaining and Wages in Greece: A Quantile Decomposition Analysis”, British Journal of 
Industrial Relations, 51 (1), pp. 80-103. 
24 
 
Dell’Aringa, C., Pagani, L. (2007), "Collective bargaining and wage dispersion in Europe." British 
Journal of Industrial Relations, 45 (1), pp. 29-54. 
DiNardo, J., Fortin, N. M. and Lemieux, T. (1996), “Labor market institutions and the 
distribution of wages, 1973–1992: a semiparametric approach”, Econometrica, 64 (5): 
1001–44. 
Fernández-Kranz, D. (2015), “Ingresos salariales en España durante la crisis económica: ¿ha 
sido efectiva la reforma de 2012?”, Cuadernos de Información Económica, 246, may/june 
Firpo, S., Fortin, N. M. and Lemieux, T. (2009), “‘Unconditional quantile regressions”, 
Econometrica, 77 (3): 953–73. 
Firpo, S., Fortin, N. M. and Lemieux (2011), “Decomposition methods in economics”, en O. 
Ashenfelter and D. Card (eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 4A, Amsterdam: North-
Holland, pp. 1–102. 
Fitzenberger, B., Kohn, K., Lembcke, A. (2008), Union density and varieties of coverage: The 
anatomy of union wage effects in Germany, IZA DP 3356. 
Freeman, R. (1984), “Longitudinal Analyses of the effects of trade unions”, Journal of Labor 
Economics 2 (1), pp. 1-26. 
Gürtzgen, N. (2006), The Effect of Firm- and Industry-level Contracts on Wages. Evidence from 
Longitudinal Linked Employer-Employee Data, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 06-082. 
Gürtzgen, N. (2016), “Estimating the Wage Premium of Collective Wage Contracts: Evidence 
from Longitudinal Linked Employer-Employee Data”, Industrial Relations, 55 (2), pp: 294-
322. 
Hartog, J., Leuven, E., Teulings, C. (2002), “Wages and the bargaining regime in a corporatist 
setting: the Netherlands”, European Journal of Political Economy, 18, pp. 317-331. 
Heinbach, W. D., Spindler, M. (2007), To Bind or not to Bind Collectively? Decomposition of 
Bargained Wage Differences Using Counterfactual Distributions, Institute for Angewandte 
Wirtschaftsforschung Discussion Paper 36. 
Hirsch, B. (2004), ”Reconsidering union wage effects: Surveying new evidence on an Old 
Topic”, Journal of Labor Research, 25 (2), pp. 233-266. 
Hirsch, B., Schumacher, E. (2004), “March bias in wage gap estimates due to earnings 
imputation”, Journal of Labor Economics, 22 (3), pp. 689-722. 
ILO (2015), Global wage report 2014/15, Geneve. 
International Monetary Fund (2015): Spain 2015 Article IV Consultation. Selected issues. 
Izquierdo, M., Lacuesta, A., Puente, S. (2013), “La reforma laboral de 2012: Un primer análisis 
de algunos de sus efectos,” Boletín Económico, September. 
25 
 
Izquierdo , M., Jimeno, J. F. (2015), "Employment, wage and price reactions to the crisis in 
Spain: firm-level evidence from the WDN survey", Banco de España Occasional Paper No. 
1503. 
Izquierdo, M., Puente, S. (2015), “La respuesta de los salarios ante cambios en la situación 
cíclica: una estimación a partir de la Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales (MCVL)”, 
Boletín Económico, june, Banco de España. 
Koenker, R. and Bassett, G. (1978), “Regression quantiles”, Econometrica, 46 (1):33–50. 
Kohn, K., Lembcke, A. (2007), Wage distributions by bargaining regime: Linked employer-
employee data. Evidence for Germany, IZA DP 2849, June. 
Lewis, G. (1986), Union relative wage effects in O. Ashenfelter and R. Layard (eds.), Handbook 
of Labor Economics, vol. 2, Elsevier, Chapter 20, pp: 1139-1181. 
López-Mourelo, E.; Malo, M. A. (2015), “El mercado de trabajo en España: El contexto 
europeo, los dos viejos desafíos y un nuevo problema”, Ekonomiaz: Revista vasca de 
economía, 87. 
Magda, I., Marsden, D., Moriconi, S. (2016), “Lower coverage but stronger unions? Institutional 
changes and union wage premia in Central Europe”, Journal of Comparative Economics 44, 
pp. 638-656. 
McGuinnes, S., Kelly, E., O’Connell, P. (2010), “The impact of wage bargaining regime on Firm-
level competitiveness and wage inequality: The case of Ireland”, Industrial Relations, 49 
(4), pp. 593-615. 
Oaxaca, R. (1973), “Male-female wage differentials in urban labor markets”, International 
Economic Review, 14 (3): 693–709. 
OCDE (2015), OECD Employment Outlook 2014. 
Orsini, K. (2014), “Wage adjustment in Spain: slow, inefficient and unfair?”, ECFIN Country 
Focus, Volume 11, Issue 10. 
Plasman, R., Rusinek, M., Rycx, F. (2007) "Wages and the bargaining regime under multi-level 
bargaining: Belgium, Denmark and Spain." European Journal of Industrial Relations, 13 (2), 
pp. 161-180. 
Rodríguez, C., Canal, J. F. (2016), Análisis de las inaplicaciones de convenios tras la reforma 
laboral”, Revista de economía laboral, 13 (2), pp. 65-91. 
Rycx, F. (2003), “Industry Wage Differentials and the Bargaining Regime in a Corporatist 
Country”, International Journal of Manpower 24 (4), pp. 347-366.  
Stephan, G.; Gerlach, K. (2005), “Wage Settlements and Wage Setting: Results from a Multi-
Level Model”, Applied Economics 37, pp. 2297-2306. 
26 
 
Visser, J. (2016), “What happened to collective bargaining during the great recession?”, IZA 




Tables and figures 
 
Table 1. 
Average wages by collective bargaining regime. 
 2002 2006 2010 2014 
Euros     
Sectoral collective agreement 7.795 8.580 10.329 11.129 
Sectoral collective agreement 10.627 11.769 13.501 13.776 
No collective agreement - - 9.141 11.496 
Differential firm agreement- sectoral agreement 2.832 3.189 3.172 2.647 
Differential no agreement- sectoral agreement   -1.188 0.367 
Logarithms     
Sectoral collective agreement 1.912 2.029 2.227 2.301 
Sectoral collective agreement 2.227 2.339 2.488 2.510 
No collective agreement - - 2.086 2.273 
Differential firm agreement- sectoral agreement 0.315 0.309 0.261 0.209 
Differential no agreement- sectoral agreement - - -0.141 -0.028 
Notes: Average wages are measured as hourly wages, and in euros and logarithms, respectively. The 






Wage differences by collective bargaining regime 
throughout the wage distribution. 
 Firm collective agreement                  No agreement 
 2002 2006 2010 2014 2010 2014 
Percentile 10        0.144 0.188 0.115 0.101 -0.274 -0.229 
Percentile 25 0.314 0.275 0.235 0.196 -0.221 -0.133 
Median 0.433 0.398 0.344 0.269 -0.090 -0.014 
Percentile 75 0.367 0.391 0.348 0.281 -0.082 0.067 
Percentile 90 0.275 0.279 0.262 0.212 -0.114 0.137 
Notes: Wages are measured as logarithms of the hourly wage and the weightings 
provided by the WES have been included in its calculation. The category of 




Wage differences by collective bargaining regime in Spain. (to be continued) 
 2002 2006 2010 2014 
Male 0.162 0.154 0.124 0.116 
 (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** 
Native -0.016 0.003 -0.008 -0.014 
 (0.007)** (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)** 
Secondary education 0.034 0.028 0.032 0.044 
 (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.006)*** 
Higher education 0.083 0.098 0.092 0.118 
 (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.008)*** 
Age less than 20 -0.251 -0.207 -0.208 -0.141 
 (0.014)*** (0.016)*** (0.032)*** (0.044)*** 
Age 20-29 -0.194 -0.145 -0.141 -0.162 
 (0.010)*** (0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.012)*** 
Age 30-39 -0.103 -0.073 -0.071 -0.073 
 (0.010)*** (0.011)*** (0.013)*** (0.011)*** 
Age 40-49 -0.049 -0.032 -0.029 -0.015 
 (0.010)*** (0.011)*** (0.013)** (0.010) 
Age 50-59 -0.015 -0.003 -0.008 0.010 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) 
Tenure 0.018 0.018 0.013 0.010 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Tenure*tenure -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)** 
Permanent contract 0.053 0.056 0.037 0.067 
 (0.005)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)*** 
Unskilled worker -0.853 -0.809 -0.790 -0.680 
 (0.015)*** (0.014)*** (0.015)*** (0.016)*** 
Blue-collar worker -0.761 -0.707 -0.699 -0.580 
 (0.015)*** (0.013)*** (0.015)*** (0.015)*** 
White-collar worker -0.727 -0.695 -0.659 -0.558 
 (0.016)*** (0.014)*** (0.015)*** (0.015)*** 
Support technician -0.529 -0.514 -0.494 -0.400 
 (0.015)*** (0.013)*** (0.014)*** (0.014)*** 
Professional technician -0.288 -0.358 -0.322 -0.222 
 (0.018)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)*** 
Region NUT2 0.144 0.127 0.127 0.114 
 (0.009)*** (0.008)*** (0.010)*** (0.011)*** 
Region NUT3 0.128 0.144 0.101 0.094 
 (0.012)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.013)*** 
Region NUT4 0.000 -0.008 0.005 -0.015 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) 
Region NUT5 0.151 0.157 0.128 0.119 
 (0.009)*** (0.008)*** (0.009)*** (0.010)*** 
Region NUT6 0.037 0.037 0.035 0.036 
 (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.010)*** (0.011)*** 
Region NUT7 0.030 -0.045 0.002 -0.041 
 (0.013)** (0.011)*** (0.017) (0.017)** 
Manufacturing -0.225 -0.173 -0.146 -0.143 
 (0.025)*** (0.016)*** (0.023)*** (0.023)*** 
Production of electricity, gas and water -0.155 -0.145 -0.132 -0.103 
 (0.032)*** (0.025)*** (0.028)*** (0.029)*** 
Construction -0.121 -0.056 -0.067 -0.087 
 (0.026)*** (0.018)*** (0.024)*** (0.026)*** 
Trade -0.209 -0.185 -0.157 -0.174 
 (0.026)*** (0.017)*** (0.024)*** (0.025)*** 
Hospitality -0.193 -0.112 -0.103 -0.110 
 (0.026)*** (0.019)*** (0.027)*** (0.029)*** 
Transport and communications -0.199 -0.170 -0.195 -0.213 





Wage differences by collective bargaining regime in Spain. (continuation)  
 2002 2006 2010 2014 
Financial intermediation -0.127 -0.056 0.027 -0.020 
 (0.035)*** (0.023)** (0.027) (0.029) 
Real estate and rental -0.264 -0.187 -0.195 -0.214 
 (0.027)*** (0.019)*** (0.024)*** (0.024)*** 
Education -0.204 -0.162 -0.102 -0.158 
 (0.034)*** (0.030)*** (0.035)*** (0.036)*** 
Health -0.263 -0.245 -0.203 -0.221 
 (0.042)*** (0.027)*** (0.026)*** (0.026)*** 
Other social and services activities -0.301 -0.258 -0.216 -0.217 
 (0.030)*** (0.020)*** (0.025)*** (0.025)*** 
Firm size 50-199 0.062 0.046 0.024 0.005 
 (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.010) 
Firm size 200 or more 0.077 0.023 0.008 -0.001 
 (0.018)*** (0.013)* (0.014) (0.015) 
Market of the firm: local -0.125 -0.095 -0.086 -0.095 
 (0.012)*** (0.014)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** 
Market of the firm: national -0.056 -0.028 -0.046 -0.056 
 (0.011)*** (0.014)* (0.010)*** (0.010)*** 
Market of the firm: E. Union -0.011 -0.012 0.009 0.001 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) 
Proportion of semi-skilled workers 0.035 -0.016 0.011 -0.019 
 (0.014)** (0.014) (0.014) (0.017) 
Proportion of skilled workers 0.117 0.170 0.148 0.083 
 (0.034)*** (0.028)*** (0.022)*** (0.029)*** 
Proportion of females -0.140 -0.087 -0.093 -0.085 
 (0.013)*** (0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.013)*** 
Proportion secondary education -0.032 -0.010 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.010)*** (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) 
Proportion higher education 0.096 0.050 0.068 0.106 
 (0.017)*** (0.018)*** (0.016)*** (0.017)*** 
Proportion fixed-term contracts -0.008 0.021 0.024 -0.002 
 (0.012) (0.011)* (0.011)** (0.014) 
Proportion of immigrants -0.033 -0.017 -0.041 -0.017 
 (0.028) (0.025) (0.020)** (0.022) 
Average tenure 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001)* (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Proportion age less than 30 0.047 0.018 0.014 0.013 
 (0.017)*** (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) 
Proportion age over 49 0.013 0.023 0.015 0.020 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) 
Propensity score - firm 0.265 0.553 0.393 0.405 
 (0.066)*** (0.055)*** (0.048)*** (0.062)*** 
Propensity score – no agreement - - -0.248 -0.143 
   (0.121)** (0.173) 
Firm collective agreement 0.065 0.075 0.064 0.055 
 (0.010)*** (0.009)*** (0.008)*** (0.009)*** 
No agreement - - -0.114 -0.045 
   (0.021)*** (0.017)*** 
Constant 2.525 2.538 2.725 2.677 
 (0.038)*** (0.031)*** (0.040)*** (0.039)*** 
     
Number of observations 164,494 179,386 144,467 139,894 
R2 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.53 





Wage gap by collective bargaining regime in Spain throughout the wage distribution. 
Conditioned quantile regression. 
 Firm collective agreement                  No agreement 
 2002 2006 2010 2014 2010 2014 
Percentile 10 0.040*** 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.033*** -0.145*** -0.133*** 
Percentile 25 0.065*** 0.066*** 0.068*** 0.056*** -0.114*** -0.077*** 
Median 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.084*** 0.075*** -0.069*** -0.025*** 
Percentile 75 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.088*** 0.090*** -0.026*** 0.020*** 
Percentile 90 0.068*** 0.065*** 0.093*** 0.094*** -0.011*** 0.044*** 
Notes: Results obtained from the estimation of conditioned quantile regressions incorporating the controls 





Wage gap by collective bargaining regime in Spain throughout the wage distribution. 
Unconditioned quantile regression. 
 Firm collective agreement                  No agreement 
 2002 2006 2010 2014 2010 2014 
Percentile 10 -0.025*** 0.058*** 0.003 0.004 -0.223*** -0.202*** 
Percentile 25 0.064*** 0.103*** 0.082*** 0.070*** -0.180*** -0.128*** 
Median 0.147*** 0.144*** 0.117*** 0.083*** -0.067*** -0.041*** 
Percentile 75 0.073*** 0.074*** 0.090*** 0.080*** -0.069*** 0.021** 
Percentile 90 0.045*** -0.005 0.030*** 0.063*** -0.117*** 0.108*** 
Notes: Results obtained from the estimation of conditioned quantile regressions incorporating the controls 












Decomposition of wage differentials between workers covered by firm and sectoral 
agreements. Estimates with unconditioned quantile regression. Methodology of 
Fortin-Lemieux-Firpo without reweighting. 2002-2006.  
 2002 2006 
 Average q=0.10 q=0.50 q=0.90 Average q=0.10 q=0.50 q=0.90 
Difference 0.315 0.144 0.434 0.275 0.309 0.188 0.398 0.279 
 (0.005)*** (0.006)*** (0.005)*** (0.009)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.008)*** 
Total explained component 0.249 0.169 0.286 0.229 0.234 0.130 0.255 0.284 
 (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.007)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.007)*** 
Total unexplained component 0.065 -0.026 0.147 0.046 0.075 0.058 0.144 -0.005 
 (0.004)*** (0.008)*** (0.004)*** (0.010)*** (0.004)*** (0.007)*** (0.004)*** (0.009) 
Explained component         
Gender 0.006 0.004 0.006 0.009 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.005 
 (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** 
Nationality -0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.002 0.002 -0.005 
 (0.000)* (0.000) (0.000)** (0.000)*** (0.000) (0.001)** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Age 0.017 0.005 0.014 0.033 0.011 0.003 0.009 0.021 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Education 0.007 0.002 0.005 0.014 0.008 0.003 0.005 0.016 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Tenure 0.049 0.025 0.058 0.054 0.046 0.022 0.049 0.067 
 (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.004)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.004)*** 
Contract 0.007 0.009 0.011 0.002 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.002 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001) (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)* 
Occupation 0.032 0.011 0.030 0.055 0.030 0.007 0.026 0.056 
 (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.003)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.003)*** 
Region -0.000 -0.002 0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 -0.006 
 (0.001) (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001) (0.001)*** 
Sector -0.020 -0.030 -0.013 -0.019 -0.029 -0.042 -0.021 -0.037 
 (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)*** 
Size of firm 0.030 -0.001 0.031 0.064 0.010 0.013 0.009 0.006 
 (0.003)*** (0.004) (0.003)*** (0.007)*** (0.003)*** (0.005)*** (0.004)** (0.007) 
Market of firm 0.025 0.019 0.026 0.026 0.021 0.011 0.018 0.027 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.003)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.003)*** 
Pscore 0.064 0.081 0.071 -0.012 0.121 0.084 0.131 0.140 
 (0.006)*** (0.008)*** (0.007)*** (0.018) (0.006)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.015)*** 
Composition of firm workforce 0.032 0.044 0.045 0.008 0.008 0.019 0.015 -0.008 
 (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.008) (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.006) 
Unexplained component         
Gender -0.003 0.013 -0.002 -0.020 0.001 0.007 0.001 -0.012 
 (0.002) (0.004)*** (0.003) (0.006)*** (0.002) (0.003)*** (0.002) (0.004)*** 
Nationality -0.010 0.010 -0.007 -0.059 -0.019 0.014 -0.037 -0.048 
 (0.014) (0.032) (0.014) (0.032)* (0.011)* (0.018) (0.010)*** (0.019)** 
Age -0.027 0.701 0.136 0.174 0.074 -0.172 -0.137 -0.352 
 (0.022) (0.111)*** (0.025)*** (0.043)*** (0.050) (0.055)*** (0.030)*** (0.062)*** 
Education 0.089 0.039 0.076 0.178 -0.102 -0.001 -0.011 -0.010 
 (0.008)*** (0.012)*** (0.011)*** (0.023)*** (0.008)*** (0.008) (0.008) (0.016) 
Tenure -0.004 0.064 0.006 -0.099 -0.001 0.010 0.046 -0.066 
 (0.008) (0.012)*** (0.009) (0.018)*** (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)*** (0.017)*** 
Contract 0.008 0.013 0.003 -0.001 0.008 0.030 0.007 -0.017 
 (0.005)* (0.010) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.009)*** (0.006) (0.006)*** 
Occupation -0.003 0.011 -0.047 0.046 0.013 -0.001 -0.041 0.094 
 (0.005) (0.005)** (0.004)*** (0.013)*** (0.004)*** (0.003) (0.003)*** (0.010)*** 
Region -0.003 -0.007 -0.007 -0.001 -0.000 -0.003 0.010 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.003)** (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)*** (0.003) 
Sector -0.000 -0.011 0.009 0.030 -0.012 -0.027 -0.018 0.034 
 (0.004) (0.007)* (0.004)** (0.010)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)*** (0.004)*** (0.008)*** 
Size of firm 0.015 0.067 0.002 -0.032 0.008 0.077 -0.002 -0.025 
 (0.004)*** (0.009)*** (0.004) (0.008)*** (0.004)** (0.006)*** (0.004) (0.005)*** 
Market of firm 0.006 0.002 0.010 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.012 -0.005 
 (0.002)** (0.002) (0.003)*** (0.007) (0.003)*** (0.003)** (0.003)*** (0.006) 
Pscore -0.060 -0.213 0.097 -0.028 -0.027 -0.257 0.172 -0.123 
 (0.023)** (0.042)*** (0.025)*** (0.051) (0.021) (0.034)*** (0.023)*** (0.036)*** 
Comp. of firm workforce -0.003 0.257 -0.115 -0.146 -0.023 0.023 -0.137 -0.144 
 (0.035) (0.072)*** (0.038)*** (0.066)** (0.035) (0.055) (0.041)*** (0.055)*** 
Constant 0.060 -0.972 -0.013 -0.002 0.147 0.352 0.278 0.667 
 (0.041) (0.131)*** (0.046) (0.084) (0.060)** (0.080)*** (0.048)*** (0.086)*** 
Number of observations 164,494 164,494 164,494 164,494 179,386 179,386 179,386 179,386 




Decomposition of wage differentials between workers covered by firm and sectoral 
agreements. Estimates with unconditioned quantile regression. Methodology of 
Fortin-Lemieux-Firpo without reweighting 2010-2014.  
 2010 2014 
 Average q=0.10 q=0.50 q=0.90 Average q=0.10 q=0.50 q=0.90 
Difference 0.261 0.115 0.345 0.262 0.210 0.101 0.269 0.213 
 (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.004)*** (0.007)*** (0.005)*** (0.006)*** (0.005)*** (0.007)*** 
Total explained component 0.197 0.112 0.227 0.232 0.153 0.097 0.186 0.149 
 (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.007)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.006)*** 
Total unexplained component 0.065 0.003 0.117 0.030 0.057 0.005 0.083 0.064 
 (0.003)*** (0.006) (0.004)*** (0.008)*** (0.004)*** (0.007) (0.005)*** (0.008)*** 
Explained component         
Gender 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.003 0.005 0.008 
 (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** 
Nationality -0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.003 -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.003 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)*** (0.000)* (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)*** 
Age 0.008 0.004 0.007 0.013 0.006 0.003 0.006 0.011 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** 
Education 0.007 0.003 0.008 0.008 0.005 0.003 0.006 0.010 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Tenure 0.038 0.017 0.040 0.057 0.032 0.018 0.034 0.045 
 (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)*** 
Contract 0.003 0.003 0.005 -0.000 0.003 0.003 0.004 -0.000 
 (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001) (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.000) 
Occupation 0.015 0.004 0.014 0.031 0.003 0.003 0.007 0.003 
 (0.002)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.003)*** (0.002)* (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.002) 
Region 0.004 0.003 0.007 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.004 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)*** 
Sector -0.012 -0.020 -0.008 -0.020 -0.004 -0.010 0.003 -0.017 
 (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.002) (0.003)*** 
Size of firm 0.007 -0.015 -0.001 0.055 0.001 0.004 -0.001 -0.006 
 (0.003)** (0.006)*** (0.004) (0.008)*** (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) 
Market of firm 0.017 0.014 0.015 0.014 0.017 0.012 0.015 0.018 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.003)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)*** 
Pscore 0.094 0.080 0.117 0.074 0.076 0.040 0.093 0.103 
 (0.006)*** (0.010)*** (0.009)*** (0.016)*** (0.006)*** (0.010)*** (0.008)*** (0.015)*** 
Composition of firm workforce 0.012 0.015 0.020 -0.003 0.007 0.018 0.014 -0.019 
 (0.002)*** (0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.006) (0.002)*** (0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.005)*** 
Unexplained component         
Gender -0.001 0.009 0.002 -0.018 -0.001 0.005 0.004 -0.015 
 (0.001) (0.002)*** (0.001) (0.003)*** (0.001) (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)*** 
Nationality -0.012 0.043 -0.019 -0.021 0.004 0.004 -0.000 0.009 
 (0.015) (0.015)*** (0.008)** (0.012)* (0.008) (0.017) (0.010) (0.013) 
Age -0.001 0.072 0.047 -0.078 -0.127 -0.172 -0.136 -0.039 
 (0.006) (0.036)** (0.024)** (0.055) (0.042)*** (0.152) (0.054)** (0.058) 
Education 0.012 0.012 0.011 -0.036 0.006 0.082 0.120 0.184 
 (0.006) (0.018) (0.015) (0.022) (0.007) (0.016)*** (0.013)*** (0.018)*** 
Tenure 0.019 0.034 0.047 -0.045 0.005 0.028 0.030 -0.065 
 (0.007)*** (0.010)*** (0.009)*** (0.016)*** (0.009) (0.013)** (0.010)*** (0.017)*** 
Contract 0.004 0.017 0.008 -0.017 0.011 0.049 0.005 -0.012 
 (0.010) (0.007)** (0.006) (0.007)** (0.005)** (0.010)*** (0.007) (0.008) 
Occupation 0.049 0.004 -0.027 0.082 0.019 0.009 -0.025 0.096 
 (0.008)*** (0.003) (0.003)*** (0.010)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)** (0.004)*** (0.010)*** 
Region -0.000 0.011 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.012 0.005 -0.006 
 (0.002) (0.005)** (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005)** (0.003)* (0.004) 
Sector -0.023 -0.010 -0.026 0.049 0.011 -0.020 0.018 0.019 
 (0.005)*** (0.007) (0.005)*** (0.010)*** (0.005)** (0.007)*** (0.005)*** (0.010)* 
Size of firm -0.013 0.035 0.016 -0.017 0.007 0.051 0.005 -0.010 
 (0.004)*** (0.008)*** (0.003)*** (0.005)*** (0.004)* (0.007)*** (0.003) (0.005)* 
Market of firm 0.045 0.002 -0.001 0.022 0.002 0.000 -0.007 0.003 
 (0.005)*** (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)*** (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)** (0.006) 
Pscore 0.007 -0.055 0.128 -0.135 0.030 -0.169 0.118 0.026 
 (0.021) (0.037) (0.021)*** (0.034)*** (0.024) (0.042)*** (0.026)*** (0.042) 
Composition of firm workforce -0.090 -0.041 -0.203 -0.001 0.006 0.209 -0.107 0.027 
 (0.032)** (0.055) (0.038)*** (0.055) (0.041) (0.069)*** (0.047)** (0.061) 
Constant 0.069 -0.130 0.132 0.243 0.081 -0.082 0.053 -0.155 
 (0.022)*** (0.057)** (0.043)*** (0.079)*** (0.056) (0.164) (0.069) (0.082)* 
Number of observations 140,820 140,820 140,820 140,820 139,894 134,539 134,539 134,539 




Decomposition of wage differentials between workers with no agreements and covered 
by sectoral agreements. Estimates with unconditioned quantile regression. 
Methodology of Fortin-Lemieux-Firpo without reweighting.  
 2010 2014 
 Average q=0.10 q=0.50 q=0.90 Average q=0.10 q=0.50 q=0.90 
Difference -0.141 -0.274 -0.090 -0.114 -0.028 -0.229 -0.014 0.141 
 (0.014)*** (0.010)*** (0.013)*** (0.020)*** (0.014)* (0.013)*** (0.015) (0.028)*** 
Total explained component -0.024 -0.050 -0.020 0.006 0.019 -0.026 0.030 0.037 
 (0.010)** (0.004)*** (0.006)*** (0.011) (0.009)** (0.004)*** (0.005)*** (0.009)*** 
Total unexplained component -0.117 -0.224 -0.069 -0.120 -0.047 -0.202 -0.043 0.104 
 (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.012)*** (0.020)*** (0.009)*** (0.014)*** (0.014)*** (0.027)*** 
Explained component         
Gender -0.010 -0.005 -0.009 -0.015 -0.007 -0.004 -0.007 -0.013 
 (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** 
Nationality 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.006 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.002 
 (0.001)** (0.000)** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
Education 0.010 0.004 0.011 0.013 0.009 0.002 0.009 0.018 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.003)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)* (0.001)*** (0.002)*** 
Tenure -0.019 -0.010 -0.020 -0.030 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.003)*** (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Contract -0.004 -0.004 -0.006 0.000 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.000 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001) (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001) 
Occupation 0.041 0.012 0.035 0.078 0.034 0.014 0.037 0.049 
 (0.006)*** (0.001)*** (0.003)*** (0.007)*** (0.005)*** (0.001)*** (0.003)*** (0.005)*** 
Region -0.010 -0.006 -0.012 -0.007 -0.004 -0.001 -0.007 -0.004 
 (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.001) (0.001)*** (0.001)** 
Sector -0.031 -0.024 -0.038 -0.018 -0.021 -0.012 -0.024 -0.030 
 (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.007)*** (0.002)*** (0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.006)*** 
Size of firm -0.002 -0.001 -0.004 -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.003 
 (0.001)*** (0.000) (0.001)*** (0.001)** (0.000) (0.000)* (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Market of firm -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.001)** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)** (0.001)* (0.000)** (0.001)*** (0.001)** 
Pscore -0.012 -0.014 0.012 -0.045 -0.002 -0.038 0.014 -0.000 
 (0.003)*** (0.005)*** (0.004)*** (0.009)*** (0.004) (0.006)*** (0.004)*** (0.009) 
Composition of firm workforce 0.018 0.001 0.016 0.039 0.015 0.018 0.012 0.019 
 (0.003)*** (0.003) (0.003)*** (0.006)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.002)*** (0.005)*** 
Unexplained component         
Gender -0.001 -0.005 -0.000 0.001 0.002 -0.000 0.002 0.003 
 (0.001) (0.002)*** (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
Nationality -0.008 0.002 -0.012 -0.023 0.014 0.000 0.043 0.019 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.030) (0.020) (0.036) (0.021)** (0.040) 
Age -0.125 0.069 0.086 0.066 -0.230 0.079 -0.083 -0.276 
 (0.069)* (0.048) (0.067) (0.091) (0.051)*** (0.448) (0.105) (0.136)** 
Education -0.099 -0.054 -0.126 -0.136 -0.111 -0.043 0.120 0.128 
 (0.021)*** (0.021)** (0.028)*** (0.039)*** (0.019)*** (0.081) (0.065)* (0.076)* 
Tenure 0.025 0.035 0.065 -0.070 0.017 -0.010 0.069 -0.044 
 (0.016) (0.014)** (0.020)*** (0.032)** (0.020) (0.023) (0.034)** (0.067) 
Contract 0.004 -0.010 0.016 -0.001 -0.000 -0.009 -0.011 0.043 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.015) (0.010) (0.019) (0.016) (0.026)* 
Occupation -0.037 -0.004 -0.039 -0.034 -0.029 -0.028 -0.052 -0.034 
 (0.010)*** (0.005) (0.009)*** (0.027) (0.009)*** (0.010)*** (0.011)*** (0.041) 
Region 0.009 -0.008 0.015 0.010 -0.013 -0.043 -0.016 0.007 
 (0.004)** (0.003)** (0.004)*** (0.006) (0.005)*** (0.009)*** (0.008)** (0.014) 
Sector -0.045 -0.061 -0.035 0.038 0.029 -0.015 0.056 0.126 
 (0.015)*** (0.011)*** (0.022) (0.028) (0.012)** (0.014) (0.022)** (0.038)*** 
Size of firm -0.032 -0.043 -0.022 0.030 -0.003 -0.041 0.004 0.038 
 (0.017)* (0.015)*** (0.021) (0.033) (0.009) (0.017)** (0.013) (0.025) 
Market of firm -0.100 -0.058 -0.097 -0.122 -0.046 -0.053 -0.054 -0.045 
 (0.015)*** (0.010)*** (0.016)*** (0.033)*** (0.011)*** (0.022)** (0.014)*** (0.028) 
Pscore 0.045 0.097 -0.038 0.172 -0.077 -0.111 -0.115 0.069 
 (0.034) (0.026)*** (0.039) (0.081)** (0.045)* (0.074) (0.064)* (0.146) 
Composition of firm workforce -0.051 -0.178 0.116 -0.312 0.086 0.561 -0.070 0.080 
 (0.084) (0.086)** (0.102) (0.150)** (0.090) (0.151)*** (0.155) (0.208) 
Constant 0.296 -0.008 0.004 0.261 0.314 -0.488 0.063 -0.010 
 (0.113)*** (0.096) (0.136) (0.176) (0.106)*** (0.464) (0.161) (0.227) 
Number of observations 108,662 108,662 108,662 108,662 105,619 105,619 105,619 105,619 




Decomposition of wage differentials between workers covered by firm and sectoral 
agreements. Estimates with unconditioned quantile regression. Methodology of 







Decomposition of wage differentials between workers with no agreements and covered 
by sectoral agreements. Estimates with unconditioned quantile regression. 






Recent studies on wage differences by bargaining regime (to be continued) 
 
Author Country  Year  Data Base (1) Bargaining regime (2) Wage differences (3) Control of selection bias  
Hartog et al. 
(2002) 
Holland 1991 Dienst Arbeidsvoorwaarden 
(S, CS) 
Industry, Firm, Extension and 
No Agreement  
Not statistically significant Partial 
Rycx (2003) Belgium 1995 Wage Structure Survey 
(WES)  (S, CS) 
National/Sectoral versus Firm 5.1%  No 
Canal and 
Rodríguez (2004) 









WES (S, CS) Sector, Firm and No 
Agreement 
Sector: 4% (90), 9% (95) 12% (01) 
Firm: 3%, 7% y 11% 
No 
Card and de la 
Rica (2006) 
Spain 1995 WES (S, CS) National/Sectoral versus Firm Men: 5.3 log points  
Women: 6.9 log points 
Partial (own methodology) 
Gürtzgen (2006) Germany  1995-
2002 
LIAB (S, LD) Sector, Firm, No Agreement Sector: 2.4 log points (West Germany) 






WES (S, CS) Sector/Firm versus No 
Agreement 
1995: 4.5 log points 




Germany 2001 WES (S, CS) Sector, Firm and  No 
Agreement 
Sector: Men qualif. West G.: 2.0 log.p. 
             Men qualif. East G.: 7.3 log.p. 
             Women qualif. West G.:  5.0 l.p. 
             Women qualif. East G.: 13.7 l.p. 
Firm: Men qualif. West G.: 0 l.p. 
           Men qualif. East G.: 0 l.p. 
           Women. qualif. West G.: 7.1 l.p. 
            Women. qualif. East G.: 13.4 l.p. 
No 
Plasman, Rusinek 




1995 WES (S, CS) Multi-Firm versus Firm Denmark: 3.1 log points 
Belgium: 4.1 log points 
Spain: 4.1 log  points 
No 
(1) S: Survey; AD: Administrative Data; CS: Cross-Section; LD: Longitudinal Data. 
(2) In italics the bargaining regime taken as a reference. 





Recent studies on wage differences by bargaining regimen (continuation) 





2001 WES (S, CS) Sector, Firm and No 
Agreement 
Sector: 3.4 log points 




Ireland 2003 National Employment 
Survey (S, CS) 
National, Sector, and other 
agreement, Firm, No Covered  
Firm: 6.8% 
No Covered: 8.6% 
Partial (Card and de la Rica, 
2006, methodology) 
Daouli et al. 
(2013) 
Greece 2006 WES (S, CS) Sector versus Firm 6.6 log points Partial (Card and de la Rica, 
2006, methodology) 





IDA (AD, DL) Sector, Two-tiered, Firm Two-tiered: 0 






Own data-set merging 
administrative data and 
firm data (AD, LD) 
Centralized, Two-tiered and 
Decentralized 
Two-tiered: 0.7 log points 
Decentralized: 5.0 log points 
Complete 




IAB (S, LD) Agreement versus No 
Agreement  
Agreement: 3% – 4% Complete 




LIAB (S, DL) Sector, Firm and No 
Agreement 










WES (S, CS) Sector, Firm and No 
Agreement  
Czech R.: No statistically significant 
Hungary: Sector 15.7 log points 
                  Firm 10.5 log points 
Poland: Sector 14.3 log points 
               Firm: 0 
Only workers unobserved skills 
by characteristics of workers in 
the same firm and occupation  
(1) S: Survey; AD: Administrative Data; CS: Cross-Section; LD: Longitudinal Data 
(2) In italics the bargaining regime taken as a reference. 





Descriptives by collective bargaining regime. (to be continued) 
 2002 2006 2010 2014 
 Sectoral Firm Sectoral Firm Sectoral Firm Sectoral Firm Sectoral Firm 
Male 0,693 0,731 0,676 0,695 0,630 0,659 0,551 0,619 0,665 0,556 
Native 0,961 0,986 0,901 0,973 0,910 0,957 0,905 0,929 0,967 0,930 
Primary education 0,282 0,220 0,279 0,216 0,192 0,141 0,105 0,183 0,139 0,135 
Secondary education 0,466 0,434 0,449 0,426 0,505 0,464 0,456 0,481 0,472 0,430 
Higher education 0,252 0,346 0,272 0,358 0,303 0,395 0,439 0,336 0,389 0,435 
Age less than 20 0,006 0,007 0,005 0,006 0,006 0,007 0,005 0,005 0,006 0,006 
Age 20-29 0,319 0,236 0,288 0,216 0,212 0,149 0,233 0,149 0,117 0,166 
Age 30-39 0,324 0,291 0,343 0,331 0,368 0,363 0,383 0,351 0,329 0,334 
Age 40-49 0,223 0,250 0,233 0,255 0,259 0,280 0,242 0,305 0,337 0,294 
Age 50-59 0,102 0,185 0,106 0,168 0,126 0,169 0,110 0,161 0,180 0,167 
Age over 59 0,026 0,031 0,025 0,024 0,029 0,032 0,027 0,029 0,031 0,033 
Tenure 6,529 12,261 5,878 10,765 7,260 11,451 5,314 8,631 12,209 8,640 
Permanent contract 0,732 0,872 0,727 0,844 0,820 0,893 0,716 0,853 0,893 0,793 
Unskilled worker 0,120 0,082 0,144 0,104 0,100 0,102 0,109 0,094 0,084 0,078 
Blue-collar worker 0,491 0,457 0,476 0,403 0,469 0,426 0,333 0,449 0,435 0,334 
White-collar worker 0,127 0,111 0,129 0,155 0,123 0,104 0,119 0,120 0,116 0,147 
Support technician 0,160 0,210 0,152 0,199 0,166 0,204 0,215 0,164 0,195 0,187 
Professional technician 0,078 0,118 0,073 0,105 0,114 0,130 0,198 0,141 0,138 0,231 
Manager 0,024 0,022 0,026 0,034 0,028 0,034 0,026 0,032 0,032 0,023 
Region NUT1 0,079 0,091 0,084 0,083 0,094 0,091 0,114 0,086 0,084 0,076 
Region NUT2 0,098 0,182 0,092 0,170 0,104 0,171 0,138 0,101 0,166 0,134 
Region NUT3 0,189 0,212 0,178 0,182 0,192 0,238 0,137 0,205 0,200 0,203 
Region NUT4 0,084 0,087 0,097 0,092 0,103 0,085 0,110 0,093 0,095 0,097 
Region NUT5 0,364 0,270 0,341 0,262 0,326 0,257 0,231 0,332 0,268 0,274 
Region NUT6 0,141 0,121 0,163 0,167 0,140 0,127 0,190 0,141 0,142 0,133 
Region NUT7 0,045 0,037 0,045 0,044 0,041 0,031 0,080 0,042 0,045 0,083 
Extractive industries 0,004 0,008 0,003 0,007 0,002 0,006 0,003 0,002 0,007 0,002 
Manufacturing 0,267 0,429 0,197 0,348 0,195 0,321 0,097 0,194 0,307 0,073 
Prod. of electricity, gas and water 0,005 0,029 0,005 0,027 0,006 0,066 0,015 0,009 0,061 0,012 
Construction 0,174 0,029 0,198 0,037 0,140 0,020 0,016 0,087 0,026 0,023 
Trade 0,190 0,118 0,207 0,152 0,217 0,171 0,182 0,223 0,159 0,294 





Descriptives by collective bargaining regime. (continuation) 
 2002 2006 2010 2014 
 Sectoral Firm Sectoral Firm Sectoral Firm Sectoral Firm Sectoral Firm 
Hospitality 0,058 0,012 0,065 0,014 0,075 0,024 0,011 0,074 0,017 0,003 
Transport and communications 0,047 0,102 0,053 0,102 0,082 0,137 0,068 0,095 0,131 0,087 
Financial intermediation 0,054 0,031 0,042 0,028 0,045 0,053 0,009 0,044 0,039 0,012 
Real estate and rental 0,121 0,115 0,143 0,104 0,135 0,115 0,264 0,141 0,130 0,231 
Education 0,029 0,011 0,025 0,011 0,029 0,010 0,060 0,040 0,008 0,017 
Health 0,026 0,050 0,031 0,090 0,044 0,047 0,156 0,061 0,085 0,166 
Other social and services activities 0,025 0,066 0,031 0,080 0,030 0,030 0,119 0,030 0,030 0,080 
Firm size less than 50 0,519 0,142 0,621 0,187 0,617 0,157 0,241 0,580 0,177 0,557 
Firm size 50-199 0,268 0,241 0,204 0,223 0,208 0,216 0,160 0,208 0,224 0,186 
Firm size 200 or more 0,213 0,617 0,175 0,590 0,175 0,627 0,599 0,212 0,599 0,257 
Market of the firm: local 0,458 0,221 0,541 0,278 0,483 0,235 0,517 0,432 0,220 0,443 
Market of the firm: national 0,409 0,477 0,360 0,459 0,399 0,512 0,382 0,398 0,457 0,412 
Market of the firm: European Union 0,062 0,160 0,047 0,129 0,046 0,083 0,040 0,063 0,079 0,042 
Market of the firm: World 0,071 0,142 0,052 0,134 0,072 0,170 0,061 0,107 0,244 0,103 
Proportion of semi-skilled workers 0,777 0,778 0,757 0,757 0,755 0,727 0,665 0,730 0,738 0,663 
Proportion of skilled workers 0,102 0,140 0,100 0,139 0,146 0,171 0,227 0,177 0,178 0,259 
Proportion of females 0,307 0,269 0,324 0,305 0,368 0,336 0,446 0,379 0,332 0,441 
Proportion secondary education 0,466 0,434 0,449 0,426 0,503 0,460 0,455 0,480 0,467 0,428 
Proportion higher education 0,252 0,346 0,272 0,358 0,305 0,399 0,440 0,338 0,394 0,437 
Proportion fixed-term contracts 0,268 0,128 0,273 0,156 0,180 0,106 0,283 0,147 0,107 0,207 
Proportion immigrans 0,039 0,014 0,099 0,027 0,090 0,044 0,095 0,071 0,033 0,071 
Average tenure 6,529 12,261 5,878 10,765 7,286 11,539 5,342 8,666 12,283 8,655 
Proportion age less than 30 0,324 0,291 0,343 0,331 0,367 0,359 0,382 0,348 0,325 0,331 
Proportion age over 49 0,223 0,250 0,233 0,255 0,261 0,282 0,242 0,307 0,337 0,295 
Number of observations 131.480 33.014 145.076 34.310 105.015 35.805 3.647 100.264 34.275 5.355 
Relative weight in the sample 0,799 0,201 0,809 0,191 0,727 0,248 0,025 0,717 0,245 0,038 





Decomposition of wage differentials between workers covered by firm and sectoral agreements. 
Methodology of Fortin-Lemieux-Firpo with and without reweighting. 
 2002 2006 2010 2014 
 Average q=0.10 q=0.50 q=0.90 Average q=0.10 q=0.50 q=0.90 Average q=0.10 q=0.50 q=0.90 Average q=0.10 q=0.50 q=0.90 
Wage differential 0.315 0.144 0.434 0.275 0.309 0.188 0.398 0.279 0.261 0.115 0.345 0.262 0.209 0.101 0.269 0.213 
A) Without reweighting                 
Composition effect 0.249 0.169 0.286 0.229 0.234 0.130 0.255 0.284 0.197 0.112 0.227 0.232 0.153 0.097 0.186 0.149 
Bargaining regime effect 0.065 -0.026 0.147 0.046 0.075 0.058 0.144 -0.005 0.065 0.003 0.117 0.030 0.057 0.005 0.083 0.064 
A) With reweighting                 
Composition effect 0.266 0.169 0.328 0.221 0.265 0.160 0.321 0.260 0.160 0.088 0.198 0.170 0.147 0.080 0.181 0.157 
Composition term error -0.001 -0.029 0.020 0.028 -0.003 -0.020 -0.023 0.027 0.000 0.001 0.013 -0.011 -0.002 -0.002 0.007 -0.014 
Bargaining regime effect error -0.024 0.010 -0.017 -0.027 -0.022 -0.004 -0.025 -0.028 0.021 0.025 0.030 0.007 -0.006 0.012 -0.004 -0.024 
Bargaining regime effect 0.073 -0.006 0.102 0.053 0.070 0.052 0.115 0.019 0.080 0.006 0.104 0.096 0.070 0.011 0.084 0.095 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
Table A.4. 
Decomposition of wage differentials between workers without agreements and covered by sectoral agreements. 
Methodology of Fortin-Lemieux-Firpo with and without reweighting. 
 2010 2014 
 Average q=0.10 q=0.50 q=0.90 Average q=0.10 q=0.50 q=0.90 
Wage differential -0.141 -0.274 -0.090 -0.114 -0.028 -0.229 -0.014 0.141 
A) Without reweighting         
Composition effect -0.024 -0.050 -0.020 0.006 0.019 -0.026 0.030 0.037 
Bargaining regime effect -0.117 -0.224 -0.069 -0.120 -0.047 -0.202 -0.043 0.104 
A) With reweighting         
Composition effect -0.011 -0.026 0.001 -0.012 0.004 -0.037 0.012 0.021 
Composition term error 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.009 -0.002 -0.006 0.001 -0.005 
Bargaining regime effect error -0.023 -0.014 -0.021 -0.008 0.011 0.013 0.013 0.007 
Bargaining regime effect -0.109 -0.235 -0.072 -0.103 -0.040 -0.198 -0.040 0.119 
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